D

Data Poisoning

Manipulating the data an AI model learns from — training sets, fine-tuning examples, or knowledge-base documents — so the resulting model is biased, broken, or contains hidden behaviors.

What it is

Data poisoning attacks the model at the source. If an attacker can influence what goes into the training data, the fine-tuning data, or the knowledge base the model retrieves from at runtime, they can shape what the model says and does. Examples include seeding public web content with subtly wrong facts so a foundation model trained on it learns those facts as truth; submitting biased examples to a feedback loop so the model drifts toward the attacker's preference; planting a "trigger phrase" backdoor so the model behaves normally except when it sees a specific code word. The closer the attacker can get to the data — the more open your training pipeline is — the easier the attack.

Why it matters

Most enterprise teams will not train models from scratch, which limits exposure to classical training-time poisoning. But almost every enterprise will fine-tune, augment with RAG, or feed agent memory from internal documents — and those pipelines are very poisonable, often without the team realizing they are pipelines at all. A single malicious document in a SharePoint folder that gets indexed into RAG can silently change agent answers across hundreds of conversations. The mitigation is treating data ingestion paths with the same rigor as code paths: provenance, access control, review, and monitoring for drift.

Key components

  • Training-data poisoning — corrupting the data a foundation model learns from
  • Fine-tuning poisoning — manipulating the small dataset used to specialize a model
  • RAG corpus poisoning — planting documents that the model will retrieve and trust
  • Backdoor / trigger attacks — embedding hidden behaviors that activate on a specific input
  • Feedback-loop poisoning — gaming the thumbs-up/down signals used for ongoing training

How it connects

In Agentforce, any content indexed into Data Cloud or used to ground Einstein responses is a potential poisoning surface — meaning the Salesforce files, knowledge articles, and external sources you connect are as security-critical as the agent configuration itself.

Good to know

You don't need a sophisticated attacker to have a poisoning problem — a well-meaning employee uploading an outdated or incorrect policy document into your knowledge base produces the same result: an agent confidently giving wrong answers at scale.

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